Abstract-With serious situation of data leakage in many enterprises, sensitive dataflow protection based on Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD) has been gradually paid much attention to. Remote attestation among two or more entities across trusted virtual domains is an important means to ensure sensitive dataflow. According to behavior compliance, this paper proposes a behavior-based attestation of policy enforcement for distributed services in trusted virtual machine, which is adapted to trusted virtual domain. In our attestation, the unified behavior of the policy model is attested rather than that of any individual security policy. The advantage of this approach is that it is not tied to any specific type of security policy, and it addresses the verification when security policies in two individual virtual domains are inconsistent. Besides, the approach easily extends remote attestation to others' behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware virtualization has drawn our eyes to date since it enjoys a rapid resurgence in recent years as a way to reduce the total cost of ownership of computer systems. Virtualization promises to improve the trustworthiness of computing platform that enables a single physical platform to isolate multiple guest operating systems in virtual machines by virtual machine monitor (VMM) running beneath them, preventing one compromised VM from affecting another VM. In a new environment for secure distributed offloading, a service will be partitioned into several components, where each component may be serviced by enforcement entities acting in certain role, and behaviors of entities are restrict under the control of security policies. For example, secure document workflows in enterprises. In certain scenarios, employees under different roles in several TVDs always perform the same tasks, particularly fine-grained access control to document workflows is necessary in certain scenarios. Usage CONtrol (UCON) model is a new fine-grained access control model beyond traditional access control, which includes such two advantages as continuity of access decision and mutability of attributes preventing document workflows from leaking. Due to attribute updating in the process of access decision, behaviors enforcement of UCON is dynamic and changeful.
According to the definition in [1] , TRUST is also the expectation that a policy model will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose. Remote attestation of behaviors compliance of UCON policy for workflows protection among two or more entities in TVDs is a cryptographic mechanism that enables remote authentication of virtual machine instances while preserving privacy under the user's control [2] , viewed as a means providing reliable evidence about the state of enforcement of security policies and the configurations in a system. However, the existing attestation proposals don't enable measurement of dynamic behavior of a target platform and typically lack flexibility to address a more general attestation problem due to changeability of UCON policies, so it is thought that they are unsuitable for remote attestation of a UCON system. This paper proposes the flexible and behavior-based attestation architecture of UCON policies for preventing workflows from being leaked to outsiders. In our attestation, behaviors of policy enforcement are attested by abstracting the unified behavior of the policy model rather than that of any individual policy. The advantage of this approach is that it is not tied to any specific type of security policies.
II. BACKGROUND
Virtualization and Trusted Computing technology have drawn our eyes to date. Virtualization enables a single physical platform to consolidate and isolate multiple guest operating systems while Trusted Computing promises enhanced security guarantees. Similar to system virtualization, trusted virtual domain (TVD) is a domain where unlimited number of virtual machines are composed, letting different tasks execute in relatively independent virtual domains, and TVD can be suitable to protect applications in collaborative computing because it doesn't matter whether the tasks are distributed in different physical computers or the same computer. However, one of the problems we are facing is that of providing sufficient measurement information to (certain) remote challengers in order for them to gain trust into a VM after gaining trust in the various layers of the virtualized platform between entities in a TVD.
A. Trusted Computing
The goals of Trusted Computing have been proposed as a means of providing trust in a computing platform. Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has released a series of specifications since it is organized, for instance TPM specification and TNC specification. TPM specification issued explains detailed description and its hardware implementation of multiple roots-of-trust. The TPM has Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), which are 160-bit registers useful for storing platform integrity measurements. The values stored in PCRs are essential for TPM functions like attestation and sealing. The TPM specification requires the first 16 PCRs to be nonresettable. However, the contents of other PCRs can be changed only by the reset or extension operations.
The goals of Trusted Computing have been proposed as a means of providing trust in a computing platform. Many computing problems could be solved if attestation can provide evidence of the behavioral properties in practice. To achieve this goal, attestation must make sense for general-purpose systems, running varied configurations, and under the control of different individuals and organizations.
B. Trusted Virtual Domain
As security requirement of document workflows is always higher on-demand than normal tasks, it must not be leaked to competitor. Virtualization makes it possible to isolate the resources of computing platform among multiple virtual machines by virtual machine monitor (VMM) running beneath them, and the isolation property of a VMM ensures that the compromise of one VM cannot affect another VM. Trusted Virtual Domains (TVD) [3] towards secure distributed services extend trusted computing base by building trust among virtual machine instances, letting a task execute in relatively independent and virtual domains and it doesn't matter whether the tasks are distributed in different physical computers or the same computer. Virtualization makes it possible to isolate the resources of computing platform among multiple virtual machines by virtual machine monitor (VMM) running beneath them, and it ensures that the compromise of one VM cannot affect another VM. Therefore, TVD can be used to host workflows leakage prevention from mutually distrusting branches in the enterprises for the specific same tasks on the same physical machine. TVD includes three components (Figure1), resp. Mutually-trusted Computing Base (MTCB), Attesting Virtual Environment (AVE) and Execution Entity (EE). The descriptions of TVD components are as follows. EE is a basic unit that runs the specific tasks in the system and proceeds according to the restrictions or policies fixed on them. Based on the underlying hardware, AVE provides higher-level attestations for the computing environment.
C. UCON Model
Usage CONtrol model [4] is a new access control model beyond traditional access control. By unifying traditional access control, trust management and digital rights management, UCON shows the continuity of access decision and mutability of attributes and covers both security and privacy issues. For the reason that sensitive document workflows has to be continuously controlled even out of owner's domain and UCON is adopted to solve this solution about continuity of access decision, this makes UCON an appropriate candidate for workflows.
A UCON model is denoted by a 5-tuple:
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TVD-based architecture for workflows protection is proposed, and behavior-based attestation aims at addressing the verification of policies enforcement when workflows are under control of secure policies in the TVDs.
A. Secure Architecture
Virtualization enables a single physical platform to consolidate and isolate multiple guest operating systems while Trusted Computing promises enhanced security guarantees. Similar to Terra [5] , the architecture (Figure2) combines trusted computing with virtual machine, leveraging the recent advances in hardware virtualization such as virtualization support in the CPU offered in latest chips from Intel and AMD. The hardware layer includes one of these chips and the TPM. The advantages of this framework are as follows: (1) excellent isolation of virtual machines prevents malware from intercepting workflows; (2) trust chain from TPM can ensure integrity of the whole virtual machine platform; (3) access control in user domains is an indispensable tool, which just allows legal users to share sensitive information. 
B. Behavior Description
In the process of UCON design, restrictions on the subjects are developed in the light of data attributes and their expected behaviors associated with these workflows, and subject attributes and corresponding behaviors must also be taken into consideration. Note that only any of security policies is an instance of UCON model and is composed of some corresponding components of the model. The expected behaviors of the policy are equal to a set of behaviors related to components of the policy, and the expected behaviors can be transformed from UCON model.
Behavior Identification
Three types of behaviors in UCON model must be identified, including subject/object behaviors, state transition behaviors and attribute behaviors.
Subjects /Objects Behaviors
These behaviors capture the subjects, objects, and rights of UCON. By Introducing an Access Control Matrix (ACM), the behaviors of subjects or objects in the UCON model are added and removed due to different state transitions. Behaviors of UCON model are trustworthy if and only if the following conditions hold:
where create(s,o,r) express adding a new subject s and object o to set of subjects S and set of active objects O, revoke(s,o,r) means behavior removing a subject or object from set of active subjects and set of objects. 
State Transition Behaviors
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C. Integrity Measurement Model
In virtual environment, a virtual machine entirely encapsulates the state of the guest operating system running inside it, and machine state is more akin to a tree where multiple instances of a VM can exist at any point in this tree at a given time. This execution model conflicts with assumptions made by systems for patch management because rolling back a machine can re-expose patched vulnerabilities and also reintroduce worms, viruses, and other malicious code that had previously been removed. As software flaws are indispensable, upgrades and patches from one version to the next require that verifiers have to manage the growing intractability of maintaining a very large list of approved software.
Remote attestation of the integrity of a remote system considers not only the configuration of the system to be attested but also its current behaviors. The model guarantees a transparent monitoring by running two VMs on the same physical machine, where the OS system and the processes to be attested in a VM are monitored.
A scheme of RA is composed of several oracles, where is a attestation identity key generation oracle by TPM, 
In the step of RA, the process can attest security properties of components after verifying the integrity of TCB.
D. Behavior-based Attestation
In TVD-based model, the components must obey the policy of TVD. The two-layered attestation is suitable of inter-domain attestation and intra-domain attestation, where inter-domain attestation is responsible for verifying security policies between domain masters in each domain and intra-domain attestation decides whether specific virtual machines for sensitive data are trustworthy.
TVD-based Model
TVD is composed of unlimited number of such compartment as VMs which can be thought as AVE, and these entities can communicate with each other freely as long as they comply with the policy in the same TVD. In a TVD, there are TVD Proxies and a TVD-Master, where a TVD Proxy monitors any behaviors of UCON policies enforcement in its corresponding VM and TVD-Master in another domain, the Controller Domain, is responsible for management of the TVD. TVD-master can attest behaviors of security policies by TVD Proxies. However, when VMs in TVD1 collaborate with other VMs in TVD2, a challenge that security policies in individual independent TVDs are always inconsistent appears.
Figure3. Model Based on Trusted Virtual Domain

Behavior Measurement
Here, it should be clear that one entity attests the trustworthiness of the other by such special protocols as direct anonymous attestation, especially the integrity of virtual machines and UCON policies. Traditional attestation techniques focus solely on the binary hashes of applications running in virtual machines. Due to attribute updating in the process of access decision, behaviors enforcement of UCON is dynamic and changeful. Therefore, TVD Proxies being a part of the TCB can measure the dynamic behavior of UCON policies in a trusted manner.
Suppose that there is a TVD-proxy in every virtual machine, and intra-domain attestation happens between VM-1 and VM-2. TVD Proxies initialize behavior log with an initialization token INIT. Whenever a call is received, it creates an entry in the log. In the process of attestation challenge, the TVD-proxies in VM monitor all changes and record every subsequent NewLog to behavior log (BLog), at the same time, a snapshot in every change to Blog is stored into TPM by extending the PCR in TPM through pcr_extend(). The PCR value after updating is explained as follows [6] .
where denotes a original value in the PCR, is a new value after updated in a change.
Monitoring the dynamic behavior is a relatively simple task. In intra-domain attestation, proxy can report the PCR value and Blog to a verifier. The challenger can verifies the update log received against the policy to decide whether all behaviors of policy enforcement occurring in the virtual machine comply with the expected behavior.
Inter-domain Attestation
Every TVD possesses a local TVD-proxy and a remote TVD-proxy called TVD-master, when components of different TVD need to communicate with each other, the proxies will ensure the confidentiality of integrity of the data flow.
Attestation is the activity of making a claim about properties of a target by supplying evidence to an appraiser. It is necessary that entities in different trusted virtual domains are attested each other in many scenarios. Virtual platforms provide a natural basis for our attestation architecture. As proposed from the above, security policies may be inconsistent in two different TVDs, it is challenging for two entities in different TVDs to communicate in a secure and unified manner. When a request comes from the source TVD-master to the target TVD-master, the trusted kernel retrieves the policies from the target master to the local TVD-proxy, the TVD-proxy starts and verifies the configuration of mentioned components w.r.t its TVD's policy. If the verification is correct, remote communication will be set up. So, the data and other information in the TVD will not be exposed or tampered because all the components abide the same policy of the same TVD. In the above inter-domain attestation steps, the protocol starts with TVD-Proxy module initiating a request by sending AttestRequest to TVD-Master in TVD1, then TVD-Master in TVD1 communicates with TVD-Master in TVD2. In the next phase, verification and negotiation is completed between TVD1-Master and TVD2-Master, for the purpose of lower attestation approach used next and set of behaviors attested. Based on information provided in the negotiation, security policy enforcement can be attested. This approach easily expands bidirectional attestation in some scenarios. Within a domain, the communication links between members of the domain may be encrypted or carried over VLAN. After the steps are completed, sensitive dataflow can be exchanged by integrating Seal() in trusted computing with SSL/TLS connection.
E. Deep attestation
Virtualization is a technique where a thin software layer running on a hardware platform can make the limited resources of the hardware platform appear as multiple, isolated copies of a hardware platform. This architecture supports a VM nested in another VM, in other words, which may be multiple layers of virtual machine instances. Therefore, some challengers may ask for more information about the VM's underlying layers besides behaviors of policy enforcement when the attested system is running inside of a virtual machine or configuration of the VM instance is not enough to attest itself.
Since the existing proposals focus mainly on clients without virtualization, the attestation proposed requires extensions to existing protocols and procedures for attesting to virtualized systems. For remote attestation of nested virtual machine instances, there are several schemes that reach the requirement. We describe layerby-layer attestation as follows in detail. The solution for attesting to a virtualized platform may be to iteratively attest to all individual layers on that platform. To do this, a challenger will first attest to software running inside of the VM using conventional protocols and procedures for retrieving logs and quotes from that system and evaluating them. In a subsequent step, the challenger then sends an attestation request to contact parameters from the virtual machine on how to reach that layer and evaluates the logs and PCR quote returned from this layer. These steps are repeated until either a layer provides evidence to sufficiently establish trust into or until the hardware TPM's CRTM is encountered. The above proposal is feasible because it can keep compliance with the existing schemes as far as possible, for example, integrity measurement, direct anonymous attestation protocols.
This approach easily expands bidirectional attestation in virtual scenarios. Within a domain, the communication links between members of the domain may be encrypted or carried over VLAN. After the steps are completed, data can be exchanged by integrating Seal() in trusted computing with SSL/TLS connection.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe a part-implementation of our attestation on an open source hypervisor Xen. All tests ran on ThinkPad R60i, consisting of one 1.73 GHz Pentium 4 processor and 3GB of RAM. The hypervisor was Xen 3.3.0, Admin OS in dom0 was Ubuntu Linux 8.04 with kernel 2.6.24, and the operating system for guest virtual machines was Ubuntu Linux 8.10 with kernel 2.6.18.
Integrity measurement agent runs on the Xen administration domain called Dom0, and the application on the Xen user domain called DomU. Xen and part of domain0 were done by using TCG-based attestation, Integrity Management Architecture (IMA) and vTPM [7] were used to measure virtual computing platform, the Dom0 domain is booted with a trusted boot loader, Trusted GRUB [8] , and its configurations are stored in a Platform Configuration Register (PCR) in the vTPM. IMA collects TCG integrity measurements of a target virtual machine and its measurement values are also stored to vTPM on a hypervisor layer. Finally, a TVD Agent in the target platform reports the proofs to the third party with TCG-based attestation over the whole Dom0 domain. A part of measurement value was showed as follows.
V. RELATED WORK
According to the definition, TRUST is also the expectation that a policy model will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose.
R. Sailer et al [9] studied IMA in detail where a target platform presents the trusted status of all its components loaded after booting to a challenger. However, IMA alone is not very practical in open and heterogeneous environments.
PRIMA [10] enhances the IMA approach by enabling integrity measurement via information flow control using SELinux policies. However, PRIMA still relies on the binary measurements of trusted subjects, and only considers a simple behavior of the system. Therefore, PRIMA alone cannot capture the dynamic behaviors of general platforms where many other security policies can be required.
Copilot [11] is a system for detecting rootkits in a Linux kernel by periodically computing direct hashes over key parts of memory that impact kernel execution, then it compares against a known value and reports to an external system that enables manual decisions to be made regarding detected changes, but the proofs it produces do not include behaviors specification in the kernel's dynamic data segment.
Property-based attestation [12] overcomes the limitations of binary attestations by mapping related system configurations to some properties. However, considering an enormous growth in hardware and software platforms especially in open environments like Internet, the mapping of all system configurations to properties is not very feasible and such mappings quickly become intractable.
Semantic remote attestation [13] proposes software's semantic analysis and requires that a Trusted Virtual Machine (TVM) running on a target platform monitors the security policy attached to the software in order to verify the behavior of the running software, meantime TVM is binary attested in order to ensure that the security policy attached to the software is indeed enforced.
Li et al [14] have presented an approach where the behavior of the security policy of a target platform is attested and complete analysis of the entire security policy of a target platform was proposed, but the approach has a very limited demonstrated scope. It does not enable measurement of dynamic behavior of a target platform. Moreover, it has been widely accepted that binary hashes of executables alone are insufficient for reasoning about trustworthiness of a platform [15] .
The current TPM specifications released by TCG include a privacy-based CA (PCA) scheme [16] and direct anonymous attestation scheme (original DAA) [17] for attesting the trustworthiness of trusted platform. The PCA-based scheme exists the obvious drawbacks that the Privacy CA needs to be involved in every transaction, moreover, if the Privacy CA and the verifier collude, the verifier will still be able to uniquely identify a TPM. To solute this problem, direct anonymous attestation (DAA) in the TPM1.2 specifications is a privacy-preserving authentication scheme adopted by the TCG. But the existing proposals can not support higher-level services for establishing trust in virtualized environments.
Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs) [18] is an abstract union including by an initiator and one or more responders. During the process of joining, all the parties specify and confirm the set of mutual requirements and each party is assured of the identity and integrity of the computer system of the remote party. The enforcement of the attestation is delegated to virtual environments.
Reference [19] presented a new method for attesting the execution of programs. It considered the problem of attesting the correctness of program executions and proposed to measure the target program and all the objects it depends on, with an assumption that the Secure Kernel and the Trusted Platform Module provide a secure execution environment through process separation. However, all the objects the target program depends on are always vague, besides verifying every related object is too complex.
Closest to view of the paper, Reference [20] proposed a mechanism for attesting the dynamic behavior of UCON by introducing the novel concept and semantics of using a small behavior manager component on the remote platform for collecting trust tokens used during attestation. The approach verified such two important behaviors of a UCON system enforcing its policies as attribute update behavior and information flow behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sensitive dataflow protection has currently attracted our attentions for increasingly serious extent of data leakage. The existing attestation proposals don't enable measurement of dynamic behavior of policy enforcement and typically lack flexibility to address a more general attestation problem due to changeability of UCON policies. In the paper, a flexible and behavior-based attestation of policy enforcement for workflow protection is proposed, which is suitable of inter-domain attestation and intra-domain attestation. The approach abstracts the unified behaviors of UCON model rather than behaviors of individual policy instance. Therefore, this attestation is not tied to any specific type of UCON policies. Moreover, it addresses a challenge that entities in individual independent TVDs are attested with each other in the case of inconsistent policy instances. The biggest advantage of this approach is that it is not tied to any specific type of security policy, and it addresses the verification when security policies in two individual virtual domains are inconsistent.
In virtualized computing environment, one of the problems we are facing is trust establishment in the various layers of the virtualized platform between entities by providing sufficient measurement information to (certain) remote challengers. Remote attestation in the case need not only authenticate security policy and corresponding VM themselves, but also all of VM's underlying layers. Our next works will focus on extension of DAA attestation and attestation model.
